David Miranda and the Constraints of the "Prescribed by Law" Requirement: Miranda v. Home Secretary, [2014] EWHC 255

Laws L.J. delivered the judgment of the Divisional Court yesterday in Miranda v. Home Secretary, [2014] EWHC 255, a judgment explained by Rosalind English and Carl Gardner, and aspects of which have also been discussed by Fiona de Londras and Colin Murray. Miranda, en route to Berlin to share confidential information with a journalist, was detained in Heathrow Airport under Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act because officers wanted to question and search him. He challenged the legality of the detention, raising unsuccessful arguments based on freedom of expression and use of power for an improper purpose.

In the course of his judgment Laws L.J. threw a couple of digs, one at the UK Supreme Court and one at the European Court of Human Rights. Mark Elliott adjudges the dig aimed at London to have hit its mark, but in my view Laws L.J. at best grazed the cheek of Strasbourg.

The Thin Line between Law and Discretion

A recurring issue in the law of judicial review is the distinction between law and discretion. Where this matters the most is in substantive review: should a similar standard of reasonableness be applied to questions of law and exercises of discretion?

Adequate Alternative Remedies and the Right to Bring Judicial Review Proceedings

An interesting aspect of the Irish Supreme Court decision in EMI Records (Ireland) Ltd. v. The Data Protection Commissioner, [2013] IESC 34 is that judicial review proceedings were taken by the applicants even though they were not targeted by the enforcement notice issued by the respondent. This notice was legally flawed: see my previous post here.

More on Discretion: Sentencing

The Supreme Court of the United States handed down Peugh v. United States today. The individual in question was sentenced according to the harsher set of sentencing guidelines that were in force at the time of sentencing rather than the milder set that were in force at the time he committed the offences.

The majority held that this amounted to a retroactive increase in punishment contrary to the ex post facto clause. That seems about right to me.  

Thomas J. has an interesting dissent (for four judges) in which he dismisses the guidelines as not of binding force and effect. The ex post facto clause applies to law, not to administrative guidelines.

This is a distinction more of form than substance, I fear. The point of introducing the guidelines is that they have normative effect and are likely to influence the exercise of discretion. If that is the case, their technically non-legal status should not be treated as dispositive.

Governance of First Nations: Federal Court Exercises Discretion not to Grant Relief

Canada's relationship with its First Nations has been in the news a great deal recently, due to the Idle No More protests. Governance is a central issue in current political discourse and it was also at the centre of Gamblin v. Norway House Cree Nation Band Council, 2012 FC 1536.

Justice Stratas on Reasonableness and Context

Justice Stratas voiced some interesting thoughts on the meaning of reasonableness and context in Canada (Attorney General) v. Abraham, 2012 FCA 266:

[44]           For example, where the decision-maker is considering a discretionary matter that is based primarily on factual and policy matters having very little legal content, the range of possible, acceptable outcomes open to the decision-maker can be expected to be quite broad. As a practical matter, the breadth of the range in that sort of case means that it will be relatively difficult for a party applying for judicial review of the decision to show that it falls outside of the range.

[45]           In other cases, however, the situation might be different. For example, where the decision-maker is considering a discretionary matter that has greater legal content, the range of possible, acceptable outcomes open to the decision-maker might be narrower. Legal matters, as opposed to factual or policy matters, admit of fewer possible, acceptable outcomes.