Internal Appellate Review: the Role of the New Refugee Appeal Division

I made a presentation last week to the members of the new Refugee Appeal Division and their legal advisers. The RAD hears appeals from the Refugee Protection Division: most of the relevant statutory provisions are contained in Part IV of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

One of the questions the members of the RAD have been asking themselves in their decisions to date is whether they should be deferential to findings made by the RPD. My presentation focused on this. My answer was a heavily qualified yes: the RAD should show some deference to the RPD, but it should not apply rigidly tests developed for review by courts of administrative decisions.

Time to Double Down on Dunsmuir?

The Supreme Court of Canada released a fascinating administrative law decision this morning: McLean v. British Columbia (Securities Commission), 2013 SCC 67. The majority reasons were written by Moldaver J.; Karakatsanis J. wrote a set of concurring reasons.

Justice Stratas on Reasonableness and Context

Justice Stratas voiced some interesting thoughts on the meaning of reasonableness and context in Canada (Attorney General) v. Abraham, 2012 FCA 266:

[44]           For example, where the decision-maker is considering a discretionary matter that is based primarily on factual and policy matters having very little legal content, the range of possible, acceptable outcomes open to the decision-maker can be expected to be quite broad. As a practical matter, the breadth of the range in that sort of case means that it will be relatively difficult for a party applying for judicial review of the decision to show that it falls outside of the range.

[45]           In other cases, however, the situation might be different. For example, where the decision-maker is considering a discretionary matter that has greater legal content, the range of possible, acceptable outcomes open to the decision-maker might be narrower. Legal matters, as opposed to factual or policy matters, admit of fewer possible, acceptable outcomes.

The Ontario Court of Appeal Provides Some Reasonableness Guidelines

In passing in its otherwise unremarkable decision in Pastore v. Aviva Canada Inc., 2012 ONCA 642, the Ontario Court of Appeal had something interesting to say about reasonableness.

Precedent and Administrative Law -- Again

I have previously blogged about the place of precedent in modern Canadian administrative law. The basic idea is not difficult to grasp. In Canada there is no presumption that there is a "right" answer to any question of law or discretion that arises before administrative bodies. Accordingly, administrative bodies are not bound by their previous decisions. As long as the decision in any given case is reasonable, then it should not be struck down just because the administrative body previously reached a different decision.

Standard of Review in the Copyright Cases

Last week the Supreme Court of Canada released its reasons in a "fivefecta" of copyright cases. Interesting questions were raised. Are additional royalties payable when a video game is downloaded rather than bought over the counter? Is streaming a communication to the public which requires payment to the copyright holder? When a consumer listens to a preview of a song on iTunes, is Apple on the hook for an extra royalty? How much copying can a teacher do to create course materials for students? And is a movie soundtrack to be treated as a whole or a collection of components? Amidst all this, the Court also found time to introduce a new innovation in standard of review.

A Theoretical Book but a Practical Approach

Over the next couple of weeks, I am going to blog occasionally about my new book, A Theory of Deference in Administrative Law:Basis, Application and Scope. For my first post, I thought I would start with something that does not really appear in the book at all: a brief overview of the approach I urge. Despite the daunting title, what I actually propose is, in my view, quite simple. I have drawn on Canadian cases to provide examples, solely because they feature in an article I am currently revising, which will shortly appear in the McGill Law Journal; I hope to post it on SSRN by the end of this week. In principle, this approach is applicable in any common law jurisdiction where there is judicial review of administrative action.

Unreasonable Exclusion of Claims by Arbitrator

Another example, this time from the Manitoba Court of Appeal, of a decision-maker stretching language too far.

Reasons and Reasonableness in Administrative Law

In describing the deferential standard of review of reasonableness in Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, the Supreme Court of Canada was very eloquent. Where a standard of review of correctness is appropriate, the reviewing court substitutes its judgment for that of the initial decision-maker. But where deference is owed,

A court conducting a review for reasonableness inquires into the qualities that make a decision reasonable, referring both to the process of articulating the reasons and to outcomes.  In judicial review, reasonableness is concerned mostly with the existence of justification, transparency and intelligibility within the decision-making process.  But it is also concerned with whether the decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law.

For more on Canadian judicial review doctrine, see my paper here.

One of the questions left unanswered by Dunsmuir was how this standard of reasonableness coheres with the duty to give reasons. This question is an important one, because the duty to give reasons has traditionally been treated as a matter of procedural fairness. When a right to procedural fairness is engaged, the standard of review is correctness: it is the reviewing court that decides whether the applicant has been treated in a procedurally fair manner.

Now, the distinction between procedure and substance is a tricky one (see my earlier post here) and here it gives rise to a problem. Assuming that the standard of review of the substance of a decision should be reasonableness, clever counsel could undermine deference by claiming that the reasons were insufficient. Adequacy of reasons, remember, attracts a standard of correctness and substitution of judgment. The idea would be to have the reviewing court substitute its judgment for that of the decision-maker in deciding whether the reasons given were adequate to explain the decision under review. An end-run around the standard of reasonableness could be accomplished by manipulating the distinction between procedure and substance.

Such sleight of hand is no longer possible after the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Newfoundland andLabrador Nurses’ Union v. Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board). Justice Abella noted with approval the warning of Professor Bryden: “courts must be careful not to confuse a finding that a tribunal’s reasoning process is inadequately revealed with disagreement over the conclusions reached by the tribunal on the evidence before it” (para. 21). She went on to explain that the better reading of Dunsmuir is that the adequacy or inadequacy of reasons goes only to whether the decision is reasonable, not to procedural fairness:

[14]    Read as a whole, I do not see Dunsmuir as standing for the proposition that the “adequacy” of reasons is a stand-alone basis for quashing a decision, or as advocating that a reviewing court undertake two discrete analyses — one for the reasons and a separate one for the result.  It is a more organic exercise — the reasons must be read together with the outcome and serve the purpose of showing whether the result falls within a range of possible outcomes.  This, it seems to me, is what the Court was saying in Dunsmuir when it told reviewing courts to look at “the qualities that make a decision reasonable, referring both to the process of articulating the reasons and to outcomes”.

Where no reasons at all have been offered in support of a decision, the failure to give reasons may be a breach of procedural fairness: “Where there are no reasons in circumstances where they are required, there is nothing to review” (para. 22). Beyond that, what matters is the reasonableness of the decision, determined in part by the adequacy of the reasons given for it.

As chance would have it, my current recreational reading is Amartya Sen’s The Idea of Justice. In explaining why the conventional economic view of rational choice is inadequate, Professor Sen comments in terms eerily reminiscent of the language used in Dunsmuir and Newfoundland Nurses:

Having reason to do something is not just a matter of an unscrutinized conviction – a strong ‘gut feeling’ – that we have ‘excellent grounds’ for doing what we choose to do. Rather, it demands that we investigate the reasons underlying the choice and consider whether the alleged reasons survive searching and critical examination, which one can undertake if and when the importance of such self-scrutiny is understood. The grounds of choice have to survive investigation based on close reasoning (with adequate reflections and, when necessary, dialogue with others), taking note of more information if and when it is relevant and accessible (p. 180).

That is not the only area of overlap between Professor Sen and the Supreme Court. In some areas of decision-making, such as labour relations, only laconic reasons need be given to parties well-versed in the intricacies of the relevant relationships and legal provisions. Taking Justice Abella’s view of the relationship between reasons and reasonableness, sparseness in explanation is not problematic. Thus it is interesting to note that Professor Sen continues: “When the reasons for a particular choice are established in our mind through experience or habit formation, we may often choose reasonably enough without sweating over the rationality of every decision” (p. 181).

Clearly, great minds think alike!

Unanswered Questions post-Dunsmuir

In a recent decision, Justice Stratas of the Federal Court of Appeal raised a host of questions about the applicability of the Supreme Court of Canada's re-shaping of judicial review doctrine to decisions taken by discretionary decision-makers:

[19]           I am inclined to find that the Director is subject to this “normal” or “usual” position of deference to his decision-making. But there exists considerable uncertainty on this, arising from Dunsmuir itself, previous case law, and the unusual circumstances of this case:

(a)        We are dealing with a Ministerial delegate, not a “tribunal” in any formal sense. In Dunsmuir the Supreme Court used the word “tribunal” on this point. In my view, although it is not perfectly clear, in Dunsmuir the Supreme Court did not intend to restrict this position of deference to interpretations by formal tribunals. Throughout its discussion of the standard of review, the Supreme Court used the terms “tribunal,” “decision maker,” “exercises of public authority,” “administrative bodies,” “adjudicative tribunal,” “adjudicative bodies,” “administrative tribunal,” and “administrative actors”: Dunsmuir, supra at paragraphs 28-29, 31, 33, 41, 47-50, 52, 54-56, and 59. It seems to have used the terms interchangeably and, collectively, they are wide enough to embrace a Ministerial delegate such as the Director.

(b)        In a relatively recent decision, albeit before Dunsmuir, the Supreme Court did not defer to the interpretation of a Ministerial delegate who was interpreting a statute closely related to his function: Hilewitz v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration); De Jong v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 SCC 57 (CanLII), 2005 SCC 57, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 706, (a visa officer making an assessment under subparagraph 19(1)(a)(ii) of the Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I‑2); see also Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Patel, 2011 FCA 187 (CanLII), 2011 FCA 187 and cases cited at paragraph 27 of Patel. This is certainly consistent with how we today approach decisions involving some other Ministerial delegates. For example, in the income tax context, income tax assessors – Ministerial delegates – are very familiar with the Income Tax Act. One might think that the normal administrative law standard of review analysis would apply to appeals of these administrators, with deference to their legal interpretations being the result: see, e.g., Canada (Director of Investigation and Research) v. Southam Inc., 1997 CanLII 385 (SCC), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 748 and Dunsmuir, supra at paragraph 54. But it does not. The Tax Court of Canada, sitting in appeal on income tax assessments, and this Court do not defer at all to the statutory interpretations of the Minister’s delegate.

(c)        The Supreme Court spoke in Dunsmuir of deference to interpretations of certain types of “statutes.” Did it mean to restrict this principle to “statutes”? There would appear to be no principled basis to do so. Deference probably also applies to interpretations of other types of laws, such as the Order in Council in this case.

(d)        The Director’s title seems to suggest that he administers programs such as this, and so he could be considered to be interpreting what Dunsmuir described as a law “closely connected with [his] function,” warranting our deference. But there is no evidence in the record on this one way or the other, nor would one expect there to be such evidence given the narrow nature of a record on judicial review.

(e)        The position of deference for administrative interpretations of statutes is said in Dunsmuir to apply only “usually” or “normally.” Does this qualification refer to the situations mentioned in Dunsmuir where the correctness standard applies? Perhaps not, as these situations largely do not involve issues of statutory interpretation. Does this qualification refer to some as yet unidentified situations? We simply do not know.

(f)         In this particular case, as we shall see, the Director did not engage in any actual interpretation of the Order in Council. Rather, he simply interpreted and applied an administrative policy made under that Order in Council. Does this mean that the Director’s decision is subject to correctness review? I am not so sure. There are statements in Dunsmuir that suggest that the Director’s failure to interpret the Order in Council may not matter. In two places in Dunsmuir, the Supreme Court suggests that in assessing the substance of decision-making under the reasonableness standard we are to examine the outcome reached by the decision-maker and not necessarily the plausibility of the reasons actually given. At paragraph 47, we are directed to ask ourselves “whether the decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law” and at paragraph 48 we are told that an administrative decision can be supported on the basis of reasons that “could [have] be[en] offered” [emphasis added].

(g)        I am not alone in my doubts on this issue. Recently, this Court discussed Dunsmuir and the standard of review that should apply to the Governor in Council’s interpretation of a statute. It found the law in this area to be unclear: Global Wireless Management Corp. v. Public Mobile Inc., 2011 FCA 194 (CanLII), 2011 FCA 194 at paragraph 35.

But the Court does not seem to be interested in resolving these questions. Leave to appeal was refused in that case, the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans has not appealed the decision that his interpretation of the Species at Risk Act was not entitled to deference, and now the Court has refused leave to appeal in the Globalive case.

Perhaps the Court has had enough of administrative law for a while.