Luckily for me, the Supreme Court of Canada's decision on Friday in
Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada, Local 30 v. Irving Pulp & Paper, Ltd., 2013 SCC 34 was not unanimous. Otherwise, I would have had to buy a hat and eat it. I discussed the decision on CBC Radio New Brunswick on Friday: you can listen to the clip here.
Showing posts with label 2011 NBCA 58. Show all posts
Showing posts with label 2011 NBCA 58. Show all posts
Tuesday, 18 June 2013
Tuesday, 4 June 2013
Some Thoughts on Rational Decision-making
Adrian Vermeule has a new paper, Rationally Arbitrary Decisions (in Administrative Law). Here is the abstract:
How should administrative law cope with genuine uncertainty, in which probabilities cannot be attached to outcomes? I argue that there is an important category of agency decisions under uncertainty is which it is rational to be arbitrary. Rational arbitrariness arises when no first-order reason can be given for the agency’s choice one way or another within a certain domain, yet the agency has valid second-order reasons to make some choice or other. When these conditions obtain, even coin-flipping may be a perfectly rational strategy of decisionmaking for agencies.The idea that coin flipping might be a rational decision-making process is provocative, but Vermeule is referring to a limited (though important) class of decisions. To fall into this class, a decision must exhibit "first-order uncertainty" -- genuinely unquantifiable uncertainty due to absence of information about facts or individuals' future actions -- and also "second-order uncertainty" -- impossible to gather further information to resolve the first-order uncertainty.
Courts should defer to rationally arbitrary decisions by agencies. There is a proper role for courts in ensuring that agencies have adequately invested resources in information-gathering, which may dispel uncertainty. Yet in some cases the value of further investments in information-gathering will itself be genuinely uncertain. If so, courts should defer to agencies’ second-order choices about informational investments on the same grounds that justify deference to agencies’ first-order choices under uncertainty.
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