Henry VIII Down Under

There are limits to what courts can do to thwart legislative enactments of Henry VIII clauses, which grant powers to the executive to modify legislation. Typically, Henry VIII clauses are included in legislation for limited periods of time, to facilitate the implementation of the statutory provisions.

Much of what governs modern life is not produced by legislators in the form of laws, but by the executive branch in the form of regulations, statutory instruments (and much more besides). Some oversight is exercised by the legislative branch, but the deluge of delegated legislation is such as to overwhelm the parliamentary committees responsible for monitoring it. Henry VIII clauses are especially problematic, because they can be used by the executive to defeat the intention of the legislature. Their purposes may be innocuous, but their use might not always be.

A Theoretical Book but a Practical Approach

Over the next couple of weeks, I am going to blog occasionally about my new book, A Theory of Deference in Administrative Law:Basis, Application and Scope. For my first post, I thought I would start with something that does not really appear in the book at all: a brief overview of the approach I urge. Despite the daunting title, what I actually propose is, in my view, quite simple. I have drawn on Canadian cases to provide examples, solely because they feature in an article I am currently revising, which will shortly appear in the McGill Law Journal; I hope to post it on SSRN by the end of this week. In principle, this approach is applicable in any common law jurisdiction where there is judicial review of administrative action.

Delegation of Law-Making Power to Private Entities

Last week the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia upheld against constitutional challenge a delegation of power to Amtrak to develop performance standards.