[19] I am inclined to find that the Director is subject to this “normal” or “usual” position of deference to his decision-making. But there exists considerable uncertainty on this, arising from Dunsmuir itself, previous case law, and the unusual circumstances of this case:
(a) We
are dealing with a Ministerial delegate, not a “tribunal” in any formal sense. In
Dunsmuir the Supreme Court used the word “tribunal” on this point. In my
view, although it is not perfectly clear, in Dunsmuir the Supreme Court did
not intend to restrict this position of deference to interpretations by formal
tribunals. Throughout its discussion of the standard of review, the Supreme
Court used the terms “tribunal,” “decision maker,” “exercises of public
authority,” “administrative
bodies,” “adjudicative tribunal,” “adjudicative bodies,” “administrative
tribunal,” and “administrative actors”: Dunsmuir, supra at paragraphs 28-29, 31, 33,
41, 47-50, 52, 54-56, and 59. It seems to have used the terms interchangeably
and, collectively, they are wide enough to embrace a Ministerial delegate such
as the Director.
(b) In a
relatively recent decision, albeit before Dunsmuir, the Supreme Court
did not defer to the interpretation of a Ministerial delegate who was
interpreting a statute closely related to his function: Hilewitz v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration); De Jong v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 SCC 57 (CanLII), 2005 SCC 57, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 706, (a visa
officer making an assessment under subparagraph 19(1)(a)(ii) of the Immigration
Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I‑2); see also Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration) v. Patel, 2011 FCA 187 (CanLII), 2011 FCA 187 and cases cited at
paragraph 27 of Patel. This is certainly consistent with how we today
approach decisions involving some other Ministerial delegates. For example, in
the income tax context, income tax assessors – Ministerial delegates – are very
familiar with the Income Tax Act. One might think that the normal
administrative law standard of review analysis would apply to appeals of these administrators,
with deference to their legal interpretations being the result: see, e.g.,
Canada (Director of Investigation and
Research) v. Southam Inc.,
1997 CanLII 385 (SCC), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 748 and Dunsmuir, supra at paragraph 54. But it
does not. The Tax Court of Canada, sitting in appeal on income tax assessments,
and this Court do not defer at all to the statutory interpretations of the
Minister’s delegate.
(c) The
Supreme Court spoke in Dunsmuir of deference to interpretations of
certain types of “statutes.” Did it mean to restrict this principle to
“statutes”? There would appear to be no principled basis to do so. Deference
probably also applies to interpretations of other types of laws, such as the
Order in Council in this case.
(d) The
Director’s title seems to suggest that he administers programs such as this,
and so he could be considered to be interpreting what Dunsmuir described
as a law “closely connected with [his] function,” warranting our deference. But
there is no evidence in the record on this one way or the other, nor would one
expect there to be such evidence given the narrow nature of a record on
judicial review.
(e) The
position of deference for administrative interpretations of statutes is said in
Dunsmuir to apply only “usually” or “normally.” Does this qualification
refer to the situations mentioned in Dunsmuir where the correctness
standard applies? Perhaps not, as these situations largely do not involve
issues of statutory interpretation. Does this qualification refer to some as yet
unidentified situations? We simply do not know.
(f) In this
particular case, as we shall see, the Director did not engage in any actual
interpretation of the Order in Council. Rather, he simply interpreted and
applied an administrative policy made under that Order in Council. Does this
mean that the Director’s decision is subject to correctness review? I am not so
sure. There are statements in Dunsmuir that suggest that the Director’s
failure to interpret the Order in Council may not matter. In two places in Dunsmuir,
the Supreme Court suggests that in assessing the substance of decision-making under
the reasonableness standard we are to examine the outcome reached by the
decision-maker and not necessarily the plausibility of the reasons actually given.
At paragraph 47, we are directed to ask ourselves “whether the decision falls
within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in
respect of the facts and law” and at paragraph 48 we are told that an
administrative decision can be supported on the basis of reasons that “could
[have] be[en] offered” [emphasis added].
(g) I
am not alone in my doubts on this issue. Recently, this Court discussed Dunsmuir
and the standard of review that should apply to the Governor in Council’s
interpretation of a statute. It found the law in this area to be unclear: Global
Wireless Management Corp. v. Public Mobile Inc., 2011 FCA 194 (CanLII), 2011 FCA 194 at paragraph
35.
But the Court does not seem to be interested in resolving these questions. Leave to appeal was refused in that case, the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans has not appealed the decision that his interpretation of the Species at Risk Act was not entitled to deference, and now the Court has refused leave to appeal in the Globalive case.
Perhaps the Court has had enough of administrative law for a while.
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