tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7665355359899630254.post4013553382395998376..comments2023-12-20T07:29:21.752-05:00Comments on Administrative Law Matters: The Mayor, Bias, Procedural Fairness, and DemocracyPaul Dalyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13433629868698007121noreply@blogger.comBlogger7125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7665355359899630254.post-26458340967910499692012-12-11T20:30:21.144-05:002012-12-11T20:30:21.144-05:00Great read ! I am happy to have discovered your b...Great read ! I am happy to have discovered your blog.E.J. Guistehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17484695890890225305noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7665355359899630254.post-55060366622757127422012-12-07T10:25:23.450-05:002012-12-07T10:25:23.450-05:00Well, I stand corrected. I read the NP piece this ...Well, I stand corrected. I read the NP piece this morning and found your quote absurd, but reading this and other posts on your blog I find that, like all things, context is king. <br /><br />I thought the alternate sanctions imposed by council were the only viable grounds for appeal after reading Hackland's decision, although I think he laid out clearly why he chose what he did. Still there's room there to go another way quite clearly. By the way, I love the use of the French transalation of the law. Not being a lawyer I'd never considered the play our bilingualism could bring to this process and I heartily await the day lawyers must bring translators and semiotics professors to court to interpret all syntagmatic (sic) chains of meaning in one and across languages. Writing loophole free and clearly defined laws in two languages simultaneously has to be the ultimate test of communication, when I thought doing it in one was already a very high wall to climb.<br /><br />Back to the point, I did not think the pecuniary interest argument had any wiggle room, but you've clearly demonstrated the flaw in Hackland's decision. Ford's obvious belief in the significance does not prove pecuniary significance, but it's an easy syllogism to believe in and makes sense on its face. I don't think that means there wasn't a pecuniary interest, but the point is made clearly here, where the excerpted quote did not. <br /><br />I think you should ask NP to link your quote to the full text, because Corcoran's pastiche of your argument with his comes out quite different. <br /><br />I only bothered to post because I love it when I get turned around on things like this. It's losing an argument in my head because I learned something, which should be the goal of any good debate in my opinion. Thanks for the good read.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7665355359899630254.post-60042474836590308952012-12-06T13:49:43.757-05:002012-12-06T13:49:43.757-05:00"Any objective standard would find that a pot..."Any objective standard would find that a potential $3,150 personal loss constitutes a significant financial interest"<br /><br />It doesn't require objectivity to see Ford had an interest. The mayor in his repeated rantings about the money, notably the purpose it was being put to, made it clear he felt that money was a significant sum. If he had kept schtum while his proxies worked out how to get him out of it, but then voted, his motivations would be harder to pinpoint and thus require recourse to some objective yardstick.Mark Dowlinghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01399115211805036553noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7665355359899630254.post-11211483936518615922012-11-28T22:53:50.947-05:002012-11-28T22:53:50.947-05:00Hard to know actual intent of mayor when he says t...Hard to know actual intent of mayor when he says to lobbyists "I'm the mayor, give to my charity". Harder to know their intent and expectation when they do so. Hardest to know what effect it has on mayor when their issue comes before council. So, strict prohibition makes sense. Refusing to abide by prohibition, refusing to acknowledge prohibition, refusing to comply with penalty, and then speaking and voting on whether to rescind financial (and personal) penalty, seems to me to be a clear violation of the Act, without justification.<br />-- Bruce Woodrow, lawyerBruce Woodrownoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7665355359899630254.post-88805226053714712742012-11-28T12:51:40.518-05:002012-11-28T12:51:40.518-05:00Thanks for the comments. There are reasonable coun...Thanks for the comments. There are reasonable counters to each aspect of my argument and in applying the law to the facts, we could argue the toss all day long. I would not be surprised to see the Divisional Court split. <br /><br />In particular, I agree that, given the factual findings, my 10(2) argument faces an uphill battle. I appreciate that I did not separate the audi alteram partem and nemo iudex issues -- but my reason for doing so is that the Act does not make the distinction: it just bundles talking and voting into the same column. Indeed, my suggestion at the end is inspired by just this sort of consideration.<br /><br />I also agree that alternative readings of the purpose(s) of the statute are possible. That said, I don't think that the purpose of promoting ethical behaviour is furthered by the sort of prohibition at issue in this case. One could say that abiding by the Act is the standard for ethical behaviour, I suppose, but that seems a bit circular.Paul Dalyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13433629868698007121noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7665355359899630254.post-42092011826083936212012-11-28T11:12:17.314-05:002012-11-28T11:12:17.314-05:00Hi Paul,
Well written, lucid post as usual, but I...Hi Paul,<br /><br />Well written, lucid post as usual, but I don't agree. Will make a couple of quick points:<br /><br />1) Any objective standard would find that a potential $3,150 personal loss constitutes a significant financial interest. So even if I buy your $10 hypothetical (and yes, a member on principle might vote and express significant interest about $10 and it might be absurd to say that should apply here) I'd say this exception fails on either an objective or subjective standard.<br /><br />2)On good faith error in judgment, it's hard to disagree with the judge about the significance of the Speaker's warning to Ford. He knew he was treading into conflict of interest territory and blithely went ahead. I would be troubled if he won on this point on appeal.<br /><br />3) I also disagree with you about the intent/purpose of the Act. It is not just about preventing corruption. It is also about ethical behaviour. The fact that Ford wasn't embezzling or committing fraud does not and should not allow him to escape the terms of the Act here - he voted on a matter in which he had a clear financial stake. We might disagree about whether the remedy imposed is overly harsh, but to me that's a policy question, not a constitutional one. <br /><br />Emmett Macfarlanenoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7665355359899630254.post-89573995851999759142012-11-27T23:00:15.433-05:002012-11-27T23:00:15.433-05:00Didn't the integrity ruling make him personall...Didn't the integrity ruling make him personally liable for the $3k? You might criticize Hackland J. for relying too heavily on Ford's subjective assessment of significance (especially since his views, on the law, were dismissed). But who's assessment is this: "It is not aimed at politicians who seek to protect their honour or save political face". Yours? With respect, I don't think that's really on the same level of objectivity as the $3k. Or perhaps, objectively, independently wealthy politicians require larger sums to be involved?<br /><br />The second bit re 10(2) is also a bit muddled. Are you talking about the speaking or the voting? You say that the law might be reformed to separate them, but surely one can separate the two right now. As Hackland J. points out at para. 24, there are two things going on here. If Ford had spoken and then not voted, then you would have a better 10(2) argument. "[I]nvoking your right to fair procedures" can mean audi alteram, but surely not nemo iudex?A Cookehttps://twitter.com/cookeamnoreply@blogger.com